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One of the major questions about quantifier interpretation is how children 
develop adult-like distributivity preferences for the many different definite plural 
types (DPs). Consider the following sentences: 
 
(1) Each boy is building a snowman. 
(2) The boys are building a snowman.  
 
Adults recognize that each semantically marks distributive events, and will 
accept (1) with scenes like Figure 1. At the same time, they reject the use of each 
with collective scenes like Figure 2. They will also disprefer distributive 
interpretations with subject DPs with all or the that do not mark distributivity, and 
will for example reject sentences like (2) with scenes like Figure 1. On the other 
hand, children up to the age of eight seem to initially not realize that each has a 
distributivity requirement, and will accept (1) with both distributive (Figure 1) and 
collective (Figure 2) scenes. Furthermore, young children also accept both 
distributive and collective readings with non-distributive DPs like all and the, 









Fig. 1. Distributive              Fig. 2. Collective                Fig. 3. Extra Object 
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There are two explanations in the literature for children’s distributivity 
interpretations and how children become adult-like in their distributivity 
preferences. One explanation is that children's non-adult distributivity preferences 
might be related to another common error children make with universal 
quantification:  spreading errors. This explanation is intuitively appealing, given 
that both phenomena involve similar sentences, and it has already been explored 
as a possible explanation by Musolino (2009). Musolino extends Geurts’s (2003) 
account for spreading errors, the weak-strong account, to a subset of non-adult 
distributivity preferences. 
The second explanation instead argues that adult distributivity preferences in 
some cases arise via a conversational implicature (Dotlačil, 2010). This account 
does not relate children’s non-adult preferences to other quantification errors. We 
will refer to this explanation as the implicature account.
The present study examines both the implicature account and the weak-strong 
account. We do this by investigating whether there is a relationship between 
children’s distributivity interpretations and their spreading errors, testing both 
phenomena in the same population of children. Additionally, because both 
accounts predict a relationship between adult-like responses and working 
memory, we also conducted a word span task. 
2. Background
2.1. The weak-strong account
Musolino (2009) outlines how Geurts’s (2003) explanation for another well-
known error in children’s interpretation of universal quantifiers, so-called 
spreading errors or overexhaustive pairing errors, might be extended to explain 
children’s non-adult distributivity preferences as well. 
Children up to the age of 9 will reject sentences like (1) with a scene like 
Figure 3, mentioning the extra snowman as the reason for the sentence being 
incorrect. Spreading errors have been extensively studied experimentally (e.g., 
Philip, 1995; Crain et al., 1996; Drozd, 2001; Roeper et al., 2006), and there are a 
number of competing theoretical accounts. Because distributivity preferences and 
spreading errors are all related to understanding the semantics of quantifiers and 
all occur until quite late in children’s language development, it is plausible that 
they have a similar origin. 
Geurts (2003) points out that an initial tendency to process both strong and
weak quantifiers as if they were weak, might be the cause of spreading errors.1
Weak quantifiers, like some and two, can have a less complex, two-part semantic 
structure, and are thus easier to process than strong quantifiers like each and all,
which have a tripartite structure. Consider the following examples:
                                               
1 Weak quantifiers can be identified by their ability to occur in existential (“there are”) 
contexts. Thus some is weak and each is strong, e.g. There are some boys building a 
snowman vs. *There are each boy building a snowman. 
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 (3)  Some boys are building a snowman. 
(4)  Four boys are building a snowman. 
(5)  Each boy is building a snowman. 
 
Semantically, generalized quantifier theory (Barwise and Cooper, 1981) 
analyzes quantifiers as signaling different types of relations between two sets: the 
restrictor set, contributed by the subject, and the scopal set, contributed by the 
predicate. However, while all quantifiers can be analyzed as relational, weak 
quantifiers do not require a relational interpretation. (3) and (4) can be interpreted 
as simply saying that at least one individual (e.g. (3)), or at least four individuals 
(e.g. (4)), have both the property of being a boy and being a snowman builder.  
A strong quantifier like (5) does require a relational interpretation between 
two sets. In addition, this relation is asymmetrical, which means that the restrictor 
set and the scopal set cannot be interchanged. Thus, each boy is building a 
snowman is different from each snowman builder is a boy. Correctly identifying 
the restrictor set is therefore necessary for the correct interpretation of a strong 
quantifier. Because of the tripartite structure, strong quantifiers are cognitively 
more demanding to process than weak quantifiers.  
Geurts (2003) argues that children’s spreading errors are caused by 
processing limitations, leading children to initially treat strong quantifiers as if 
they were weak, leaving the restrictor position semantically underdetermined.2 
Faced with this underspecified semantic representation, Geurts (2003) suggests 
that children identify the restrictor set by pragmatics. If the children interpret ‘the 
boys’ as the most salient discourse referent they will show adult-like responses, 
but if they find ‘the snowmen’ most salient, spreading errors will occur. If the 
snowmen become the restrictor, the children will interpret (5) as if it were: each 
snowman is being built by a boy, leading to a false rejection of the sentence, which 
is called a spreading error.  
Musolino (2009) builds on the intuition that children’s non-adult-like 
distributivity interpretations might have the same cause as spreading errors. 
Taking Geurts’s (2003) account as a basis, he shows how the account could be 
extended to explain the non-adult interpretation preferences in his study. Musolino 
(2009) used a truth-value judgement task with children between ages four and six 
to study sentences with numerically quantified subjects with either the quantifier 
each (6) or another numerically quantified expression (7) as the object. 
 
(6) Three boys are holding each balloon.  
(7) Three boys are holding two balloons. 
 
In particular, Musolino (2009) suggests that a failure to correctly identify the 
restrictor set might explain why children strongly accepted a distributive 
interpretation (Figure 4) with sentences like (6) (90% compared to adults 31%). 
                                               
2 Note that Geurts’s (2003) account is only one of several explanations for spreading errors. 
See also for example Philip (1995) and Roeper et al. (2006) for alternative accounts. 
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Additionally, it could explain why children accepted cumulative interpretations 
(Figure 5) much more often than adults did (54% compared to 17% acceptance 
with adult subjects).  A cumulative interpretation can be understood as a 
combination of a distributive and a collective interpretation, as in Figure 5, where 




Figure 4. Distributive Figure 5. Cumulative 
 
 
Briefly, if the children were to treat the three boys as the restrictor (rather than 
the balloons, which is the adult interpretation) they will interpret (6) as Each of 
the three boys is holding a balloon, which would be true for both the distributive 
reading (Figure 4) and the cumulative reading (Figure 5). Note that there is a 
general preference for adults (and children) to give each a distributive reading. 
In general, Musolino’s (2009) subjects were very accepting, with the biggest 
outlier being the cumulative reading. This reading was only accepted 54% of the 
time by the children, though this was still much higher than the 17% acceptance 
rate of the adults.  
Musolino extends Geurts’s (2003) explanation to object each items like (6), 
but because numerically quantified expressions are actually weak quantifiers 
Geurts’s (2003) account cannot offer an explanation for some of the other non-
adult interpretations. For example, it does not explain why children rejected the 
cumulative readings with sentences like (7) (76% of the time compared to 21.9% 
for adults). Also, if children understand that each marks distributivity, why do 
they allow distributive readings in cases in which there is no distributive marker? 
Musolino’s (2009) extension also does not explain why children would choose 
different sets as restrictor sets in different situations and does not elaborate on how 
pragmatics influence the final interpretation.  
Extending the weak-strong account to explain children’s non-adult-like 
collective interpretations of subject each DPs such as (5) seems possible. In this 
case, the account would be that children will misinterpret each in (5) as a weak 
quantifier with an unspecified restrictor set, and then by pragmatic reasoning 
determine that restrictor set. If the child considers the snowman the most salient 
discourse entity, this account predicts that the child will interpret a sentence like 
(5) as each snowman is being built by a boy. A collective situation would have to 
be considered marginal for the truth of this sentence (considered true in cases 
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where there is only one snowman).3 Therefore, non-adult-like acceptances of 
collective interpretations with a distributive marker can be explained by an error 
in mapping the syntax to the correct semantics. This account has the advantage 
over the implicature account that is does not rely on the claim that children have 
an inadequate or incomplete understanding of the semantics of each. 
If the intuition that non-adult distributivity interpretations are related to 
spreading errors is correct, we would expect them to occur approximately at the 
same time, and to disappear at the same time as well. If this is the case, we need 
to look for an explanation that can handle both distributivity preferences and 
spreading errors. The weak-strong account is a useful candidate since it has 
already been applied to a subset of non-adult distributive interpretations in 
Musolino (2009).  
 
2.2. The implicature account 
 
An alternative account of children’s non-adult distributivity interpretations 
attributes it to a lack of pragmatic reasoning. Dotlačil (2010) argues that adult 
preferences for collective interpretations with non-distributive DPs are derived via 
a conversational implicature. For adults, each clearly marks distributivity. When 
a speaker describes a scene but does not use a distributive marker, adults will 
reason that if a distributive interpretation was intended, then the speaker would 
have used a distributive quantifier such as each. Via an implicature, DPs with a 
definite article like the boys are preferentially interpreted as collective, because 
they become pragmatically dispreferred with distributive interpretations, even if 
they are semantically neutral regarding distributivity.  
This account then explains, children’s non-adult acceptance of distributive 
readings when there is no distributive marker, and their acceptance of collective 
readings when a distributive marker is present, as originating from an initial state 
where children do not know that each requires a distributive interpretation. 
Children must first realize that semantically each requires distributivity. After 
reaching this realization they can calculate implicatures based on the absence of 
distributive markers by inferring that a sentence with a definite article is intended 
to express a collective meaning. A number of studies (Brooks and Braine, 1996; 
Pagliarini et al., 2012; Syrett and Musolino, 2013; de Koster et al., 2017) have 
suggested that children initially do not understand that each marks distributivity, 
treating DPs with each similarly to DPs headed by all and the. For this reason, the 
implicature account predicts that only when children begin to reject collective 
contexts with each, will they be able to begin to calculate implicatures based on 
each’s distributivity requirement in relation to other DP types. Some experimental 
research has backed up this claim. Pagnialini et al. (2012) for Italian and de Koster 
et al. (2017) for Dutch have shown a correlation between the rejection of each 
with collective contexts and the rejection of the with distributive contexts. 
                                               
3 Each and other universal quantifiers seem to have a felicity requirement that the restrictor 
set should be plural. This account would have to ignore this requirement.   
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The implicature account thus does not predict any relation between spreading 
errors and adult-like distributivity preferences. It also differs from the weak-strong 
account in that it does not simply see non-adult preferences as stemming entirely 
from a processing difficulty, but rather ascribes errors to the fact that children do 
not yet know that each lexically encodes distributivity, as well as to a processing 
delay in implicature calculation, which is known to require cognitive resources.
2.3. Working Memory
Both accounts predict a relationship between the adult interpretation and 
working memory capacity.  The weak-strong account essentially proposes that 
children treat strong quantifiers as if they are weak, because weak quantifiers are 
easier to process due to their less complex (semantic) structure. This proposal is 
backed up by findings of Just (1974) and Meyer (1970), who found that 
participants showed shorter response times when interpreting weak quantifiers 
compared to strong quantifiers. Connecting this to spreading errors and 
distributivity interpretations, one would expect children to make fewer spreading 
errors and more often show the adult collective preference when they have a 
higher working memory capacity. 
The implicature processing literature has concluded that implicatures are not 
default inferences. Their calculation takes time, requires memory resources and 
probably occurs after the calculation of the literal (semantic) interpretation (e.g., 
Bott and Noveck 2004; Bott et al. 2012). Marty and Chemla (2013) have also 
shown that participants calculated fewer implicatures under high working memory 
load. From these findings we expect that children with a higher working memory 
capacity should show the adult collective preference or at least show a higher rate 
of rejections of distributive contexts in combination with plural definites. 
To examine these working memory predictions we carried out a word span 
memory task with all participants. 
3. Method
3.1. Participants
185 monolingual Dutch-speaking children, divided into eight different age 
groups from 4 to 11 years old participated in the experiment. They were recruited 
from two primary schools in Groningen, the Netherlands, and carried out the 
experiment in a quiet room in their school. Twelve adults (mean age 20.2), mainly
university students, served as a control group. They received a small monetary 
compensation for participating in the experiment.
3.2. Word Span Task
A word span task was performed to test predictions related to memory. We 
used an adapted version of the Schlichting Test of Language Production 
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(Schlichting et al., 1995), with sequences of one to nine words. All words were 
obtained from the Lexilijst (Schlichting et al., 1995), which is designed for 
children between 1;9 and 2;3 years old. The words were mainly monosyllabic with 
a CVC-structure (consonant-vowel-consonant).  
Participants were asked to repeat word sequences after they were read aloud 
by the experimenter. Every new word sequence consisted of a practice item plus 
three test items. The test was terminated when a participant incorrectly repeated 
three items in a row. The maximum score that could be obtained was 25. 
 
3.3. Linguistic Task 
 
The linguistic task was a sentence-picture verification task in a 2x4 design 
with the factors SENTENCE and PICTURE. It aimed to test the relationship between 
children’s distributivity interpretations and their spreading errors. 
 
3.3.1. Design and Procedure 
 
The task included two sentence types (definite, quantifier) and four picture 
types (collective, distributive, extra object, extra subject), resulting in eight test 
conditions. Sentences started either with the plural definite de ‘the’ (8) or with the 
universal quantifier elke ‘each’ (9). Both sentence types had the same Subject-
Verb-Indefinite Object structure. The following eight Dutch verbs were used: 
vasthouden, dragen, tillen, trekken, duwen, verven, wassen and bouwen (in 
English: hold, carry, lift, push, pull, paint, wash and build). 
 
(8)   De jongens wassen een boot. 
   The boy.PL wash.PL a boat.SG 
   The boys are washing a boat. 
 
  (9)    Elke jongen wast een boot. 
   Each boy.SG wash.SG a boat.SG 
   Each boy is washing a boat.  
 
 
    
Fig. 6. Collective Fig. 7. Distributive Fig. 8. Extra Object Fig. 9. Extra Subject 
The four picture types used were: a collective picture (Figure 6), an exhaustive 
distributive picture (Figure 7), a distributive picture with an extra object (Figure 
8) and a distributive picture with an extra subject (Figure 9). Subjects were boys, 
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girls, monkeys or dogs and every picture contained a different object. Responses 
to the collective and distributive picture inform us about children’s distributivity 
interpretations, while responses to the extra object and extra subject picture tell us 
whether children make spreading errors. 
Each participant saw four items per condition, plus twelve control items. The 
test session started with four practice items. During the experiment, participants 
were presented with one picture at a time while a recorded sentence was played. 
They were instructed to verify whether the sentence matched the picture or not, 
and were also asked to justify their ‘no’ responses. 
3.3.2. Predictions
Table 1. Predicted responses per condition for both children and adults
Condition Child Adult Condition Child Adult
The - Collective yes yes Each – Collective yes no
The - Distributive yes no Each – Distributive yes yes
The - Extra Object no ? Each - Extra Object no yes
The - Extra Subject no ? Each - Extra Subject no no
Table 1 shows the predicted responses for each of the eight conditions for 
children and adults. Conditions The-Collective and Each-Distributive are 
straightforward: we expect both children and adults to fully accept these 
conditions. The conditions Each-Collective and The-Distributive will give us 
more insight into children’s distributivity interpretations: we expect young 
children to accept both conditions, while we expect adults to reject these 
conditions. Adults are expected to reject Each-Collective, since the quantifier each
is a very strong marker for distributivity, indicating that the collective 
interpretation with each is infelicitous. Young children, until the age of 8 years 
old, have been argued to have an incomplete understanding of the quantifier each
(Brooks and Braine, 1996; Syrett and Musolino, 2013). Each is not yet a strong 
distributive marker to them, leading to the acceptance of the condition Each-
Collective.
It has been found that adults, unlike children, show a collective preference for 
definite plurals such as the (Frazier et al, 1993; Kaup et al, 2002; Dotlačil, 2010).
Recall from the background section that Dotlačil (2010) has argued that the adult 
collective preference with the definite article comes from a conversational 
implicature. Under this account, adults realize that the speaker could have used a 
distributive marker if they intended a distributive meaning, and thus interpret the 
lack of a distributive marking as collective. We therefore predict adults to reject 
condition The-Distributive. Children, on the other hand, do not show such a 
collective preference and fully accept distributive situations. We therefore predict 
that they will accept condition The-Distributive.
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The condition Each-Extra Object directly tests whether children show 
spreading errors. Based on the previous research literature, we predict young 
children to reject condition Each-Extra Object.  
Condition Each-Extra Subject examines a different type of error with 
universal quantification, namely so-called underexhaustive errors. These errors 
result from an incorrect acceptance of each in combination with an extra subject 
not performing the action (Figure. 9). It has been found that underexhaustive 
errors only occur at a very young age (until age 6) and that they precede spreading 
errors (Geurts, 2003). This condition will show us at what age children understand 
that each has an exhaustivity requirement.  
The question marks for the conditions The-Extra Object and The-Extra 
Subject in Table 1 signal ambiguity. A rejection of these conditions has two 
potential explanations. Condition The-Extra Object could either be rejected due to 
the extra object, which would indicate a spreading error, or could be rejected due 
to a collective preference, preferring all subjects to perform the action together. 
Condition The-Extra Subject could be rejected because of a collective preference, 
but also because of an exhaustivity preference, preferring all boys to perform the 




Table 2. Proportion of adult-like-responses per age group and condition. Age at 
which adult performance is reached is indicated by the gray cells. The results of 
conditions The-Extra Object and The-Extra Subject are omitted due to ambiguity 
(see Section 3.3.2).  
 
 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Adult 
Each - Distributive 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
The - Collective 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 1 0.97 1 
Each - Collective 0.14 0.21 0.35 0.64 0.82 0.69 0.81 0.83 0.65 
The - Distributive 0.02 0.02 0 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.34 0.40 0.75 
Each - Extra Object 0.52 0.36 0.33 0.56 0.57 0.73 0.97 1 1 
Each - Extra Subject 0.59 0.79 0.80 0.95 0.90 0.96 1 1 0.98 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive results. It shows that even the youngest 
children fully accepted conditions Each-Distributive and The-Collective as 
predicted. Table 2 also shows that by age 7, children reached the adult 
interpretation for conditions Each-Collective and Each-Subject. This indicates 
that by age 7 children have a complete understanding of each; they notice that 
each marks distributivity and correctly reject situations in which an extra subject 
is not performing the action.  Looking at Table 2, it becomes clear that there is 
only one condition in which the children in our sample did not reach the adult 
interpretation at all yet, namely condition The-Distributive. Children rejected this 
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condition in only 40% of the cases at age 11, not yet approaching the adult 
rejection rate of 75%.  
The results of condition Each-Extra Object show that spreading errors 
become infrequent at age 9, and are virtually non-existent by age 10. There seems 
to be a gap between the disappearance of spreading errors (age 9) and the rejection 
of The-Distributive (after age 11). This gap of about two years is difficult to 
reconcile with the idea that both phenomena share the same cause.  
Besides this, we also found an age gap of about one year between the correct 
interpretation of Each-Collective (age 7) and the disappearance of spreading errors 
(age 9). So children already seem to understand that each requires distributivity 
before they stop spreading. This result suggests that it is unlikely that there is a 
relationship between the non-adult-like acceptance of each in the collective 
context and spreading errors, contra the extended weak-strong account.  
The data was analyzed using Generalized Additive Mixed Modeling  (Wood, 
2006) and the R-packages mgcv and itsadug (van Rij et al., 2015). We included 
the maximal random effect structure licensed by the data, which consist of random 
intercepts for ‘Participants’ and ‘Items’. The best-fitting model included the 
nonlinear interactions ‘Age by Condition’ and ‘Memory by Condition’. The 
results are visualized in Figure 10. Both graphs show summed effects; random 
effects are canceled out. The graphs are transformed back to proportion scale and 
shading shows the confidence intervals. Note that the graphs show the proportion 
of adult-like responses, which means rejection rates for conditions The-
Distributive, Each-Collective and Each-Extra Subject  and acceptance rate for 
Each-Extra Object. The graphs only show the results of the children.  
 
 




























2  4  6  8 10 12 14
Age  Memory score
 A.  B. 
Figure 10. Children’s proportion of adult-like-responses plotted against age in 
years (A, left) and memory score (B, right). 
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Figure 10A shows that condition The-Distributive is significantly different 
from the other conditions and has not reached the adult interpretation (a rejection 
rate of 75%), unlike the other conditions. Figure 10B and summary statistics show 
that memory only had a significant effect on condition The-Distributive (p<0.001), 
with no effect in the other conditions (taking into account the confidence intervals, 
those conditions are almost straight lines). Higher memory scores are related to a 
greater likelihood of rejecting the The-Distributive condition. In sum, memory 
score was only significantly related to children’s distributivity interpretations and 
not to their spreading errors (condition Each-Extra Object).  
 
5. Discussion  
 
This study focused on two accounts explaining children’s distributivity 
interpretations: the weak-strong account linking these interpretations to spreading 
errors, and Dotlačil’s (2010) implicature account. We collected new data to shed 
more light on the origin of children’s interpretation errors by testing the same 
population of children on their distributivity interpretations and their tendency to 
make spreading errors. We further assessed their auditory memory.  
Now we can answer two questions: 1) are children’s distributivity 
interpretations and spreading errors related, and 2) is there evidence of implicature 
calculation in the development of an adult-like preference for definite articles with 
collective readings?  
Looking at the results, we found an age gap of more two years between the 
development of an adult collective preference with the and the disappearance of 
spreading errors, which is unlikely if these errors share the same cause. Spreading 
errors become infrequent at age 9. At this age, children still incorrectly almost 
fully accept the The-Distributive condition (88%). On the other hand, rejection of 
the distributive context with the definite DP only begins to show at age 11, and 
even at that age children have not yet reached the adult rejection rate. Examining 
individual children, we found children that showed zero spreading errors but fully 
accepted distributive situations in combination with the definite plural the. This is 
unexpected if both phenomena have the same origin. 
When we look more closely at the predictions that the weak-strong account 
specifically makes in relation to working memory, we do not find support for this 
account in our results. Recall that the weak-strong account predicts that spreading 
errors are caused by a misinterpretation of strong quantifiers as if they were weak. 
This is believed to be due to children having insufficient cognitive capacity to get 
the semantically more complex strong interpretation. This explanation suggests 
that a higher working memory score should correlate with lower rates of 
spreading. However, our results did not show an effect of memory scores for the 
Each-Extra Object spreading condition, which is unexpected if the weak-strong 
account is correct. Also note that we did find an effect of memory with the The-
Distributive condition, so we believe the word span task was sufficiently sensitive.  
In sum, given the large gap between the age at which spreading errors 
disappear and the age at which adult-like distributivity interpretations emerge, we 
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did not find evidence to support a common origin of distributivity interpretation 
preferences and spreading errors. Additionally, our results do not show an effect 
of memory in predicting spreading errors, which is counter the predictions the 
weak-strong account makes in its explanation of spreading.   
Now let us turn to how our results relate to Dotlačil’s (2010) implicature 
account. First, we should note that adults do not fully reject the condition The-
Distributive, showing a rejection rate of 75%. However, if the rejection of The-
Distributive is calculated via a conversational implicature, this rate is not 
inconsistent. Rates of implicature calculation have been shown to vary across 
different lexical items, with most types of implicatures calculated between 30% 
to 70% of the time (cf., van Tiel et al., 2016). In fact, Pagliarini et al. (2012) and 
de Koster et al. (2017) both found adult rejection rates of around 50% for the exact 
same condition (definite subject with distributive picture). This means our adult 
results fit with the implicature account.  
The implicature account assumes that the calculation of the implicature 
involved in the rejection of the The-Distributive condition requires working 
memory. This suggests that a lower memory score will correlate with an inability 
to calculate this implicature, which would result in the acceptance of the 
distributive context. Consistent with the predictions of the implicature account, 
we only found a significant effect of memory scores on the condition where the 
implicature calculation is assumed to take place, namely the The-Distributive 
condition.  
Children’s justifications of their ‘no’ responses, which we asked for 
consistently, also suggest that children rejected The-Distributive items because 
they calculated an implicature. Many children gave clarifications like: ‘the 
computer did not say each, so I say no’, or ‘they should all wash one boat together, 
not each their own boat’, or ‘it would have been better if there was one boat with 
three boys washing it, but I’m not sure’. These clarifications strongly suggest that 
the children were reasoning about other options. In some cases they even asked us 
if they were allowed to consider other options. 
Also note that the justifications of the rejections of the spreading condition 
Each-Extra Object were consistent with our predictions. Virtually all rejections 
were justified by pointing at the extra object: ‘No, because that boat does not have 
a boy’, or ‘No, there is one boat without a boy’, a  result that has been shown in 
other studies as well. The justifications of the children are in line with the weak-
strong account because they suggest a focus on the object and/or predicate.  
However, we also noticed that most of the children either show spreading 
errors at every item, or show no spreading errors at all. This is inconsistent with 
the weak-strong account, because we would expect both correct and incorrect 
responses in children using a weak-quantifier interpretation strategy. With an 
unspecified restrictor set, both the subject noun and the object noun could in 
theory contribute the restrictor set. It is quite unexpected that children who are 
confused about which set is the restrictor would consistently interpret it as the set 
contributed by the predicate. Of course, visually it could be that the type of 
drawings we used made the extra object consistently more salient. However, we 
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know that children still show spreading in cases where materials are presented 
verbally, suggesting that it is more than visual salience that leads children to treat 
the object or the predicate rather than the subject noun as the restrictor set. 
In sum, we found evidence against the weak-strong account of spreading and
against a common origin of spreading and non-adult-like distributivity 
interpretations, and evidence supporting an implicature account. 
We are able to draw these conclusions because, we tested spreading and 
distributivity interpretations in the same population of children.  However, our 
results would have been stronger if we could have tested the same children at 
several moments during their development. The implicature account predicts that 
children need to have a correct understanding of each as a prerequisite for the 
calculation of the implicature, predicting that we should see that children first 
reject Each-Collective and then begin to reject The-Distributive. Whereas
Pagliarini et al. (2012) and de Koster et al. (2017) found a correlation between 
these two conditions, it would be stronger if we could confirm this pattern in a 
longitudinal study.
6. Conclusions 
We found an age gap between the end of spreading errors and the beginning 
of adult-like distributivity interpretations. This suggests that these two phenomena 
do not have a similar origin. We also did not find a relationship between memory 
scores and the tendency to spread, contrary the prediction of the weak-strong 
account. Furthermore, we do not have a clear picture of what semantic knowledge 
children have about each. More research is needed both into the origin of 
spreading and into children’s lexical-semantic knowledge of quantifiers.
We did find an effect of memory scores on the rejection of definite DP 
subjects with collective pictures, consistent with the implicature account. In 
addition, children’s justifications for their rejection of the The-Collective 
condition suggest they were calculating an implicature. 
In sum, our results support the implicature account explaining children’s
distributivity interpretations. However, our research only looked at definite DPs. 
Future work should look at a range of DP types to give a full picture of how 
distributivity preferences develop.
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